T.H. Green's Theory of Positive Freedom by Ben Wempe

Author:Ben Wempe
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: TH Green, positive freedom, politics, political science, public policy, political theory, philosophy, metaphysics, political philosophy, Hegel, epistemology, psychology, aristotle, idealism, moral philosophy, teleology, time, eternity, political obligation, morality, utilitarianism, liberalism, Mill, Isaiah Berlin
ISBN: 9781845405885
Publisher: Andrews UK Limited 2017
Published: 2017-01-19T00:00:00+00:00

In order to appreciate Green’s doctrine of positive freedom in its proper context, it should be considered in connection with the idealist philosophy of consciousness. As was explained in the foregoing chapter, Green interpreted the development of both individual and collective human consciousness in terms of a doctrine of self-assertion of reason. In the same way as negative freedom is defined as a condition of absence of restraint, positive freedom should be seen as a condition in which man determines himself according to what Green refers to in his professorial lectures as ‘the law of his being’. [13]

According to the idealist philosophy of consciousness it is inherent in the developmental logic of individual consciousness that individual man will recognise his fellow men as equally gifted with rational faculties and for that reason essentially equal to himself. It is on this mutual recognition by the members of a community that the entire fabric of society rests. As a first step in reconstructing the metaphysical basis of Green’s positive conception of freedom, I will explore Green’s claim that such a recognition is indeed inherent in the development of human consciousness. In order to explain this point I need to elaborate a part of his philosophy of consciousness, notably the part dealing with human willing, or practical reason.

According to idealist moral psychology, individual man presents to himself images of states of affairs which he holds to be desirable. This continually presenting himself ends or ideals is intrinsic to the way in which he relates to the external world. It constitutes a distinguishing feature of human nature. Each agent conjectures a certain image of what, at a given point in time, his personal good consists in. This conception of personal good, or representation of a certain desirable state of things governs his activity; it is by means of his activity that he will try to bring such an ideal state into existence. As consciousness grows, such a practical conception develops accordingly. A given practical conception directs human conduct and structures the activity of each individual agent.

The central thesis of Green’s moral psychology, then, is that this development actually shows an ever increasing rationalization. As was explained in Chapter Two, Green develops two complementary lines of argument to substantiate this thesis. On the one hand he makes a purely empirical claim: the actual course of human history indeed reveals such a process of rationalization, both in terms of the moral norms held in society and at the level of individual human agents. On the other hand, Green argues that such a development can only be explained teleologically, in terms of the self-realization of reason. In his view, this assumption must be made in order to explain why at each stage in the process of social development individual agents are aware of a certain moral ideal with which they identify their practical conception of well-being. Moral conduct can be adequately understood only by rendering human activity in terms of some ‘consciously self-realising principle,’ i.e.

a principle that

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